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Abstract
This research examined the dimensionality and the correlates of self-reported cognitive failures.  The 
first goal was to determine what factors, in addition to a general one, are needed to explain self-reported 
cognitive failures.  To explore this issue, both Rasch measurement and confirmatory factor analysis were 
employed.  The second goal was to determine if cognitive failures might be predicted with personality 
factors, general cognitive ability, and the need for cognition. A sample of 552 USAF airmen responded 
to the Broadbent Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ), a Big-Five personality inventory, the Abstract 
Reasoning Test, the Speeded Cognitive Ability Test, and the Need for Cognition survey.  Both Rasch 
modeling and confirmatory factor analysis indicated that a single factor dominated CFQ responses. 
Regression analysis showed that CFQ responses were predicted well by personality factors (R = .60).
Resumen
Esta investigación examinó la dimensionalidad y los determinantes de las fallas cognitivas 
autoinformadas. El primer objetivo fue determinar qué factores podrían ser necesarios para explicar 
los fallos cognitivos autoinformados. Para llevar a cabo esto, se emplearon tanto la medición de Rasch 
como el análisis factorial confirmatorio. El segundo objetivo, era determinar si las fallas cognitivas 
podrían predecirse a partir de factores de personalidad, la capacidad cognitiva general y la necesidad 
de cognición.  Una muestra de 552 aviadores de la Fuerza Aérea de los Estados Unidos de América 
(USAF), respondió al Cuestionario de Fallas Cognitivas Broadbent (CFQ), el cuestionario Big-Five de 
personalidad, la Prueba de Razonamiento Abstracto, la Prueba de Habilidad Cognitiva Acelerada, y la 
Encuesta de Necesidad de Cognición. Tanto el modelo de Rasch como el análisis factorial confirmatorio 
indicaron que un solo factor agrupaba las respuestas de CFQ. El análisis de regresión mostró que las 
respuestas de CFQ se pronosticaron bien por factores de personalidad (R = .60).
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Introduction
Cognitive failures are “absent-minded” errors that occur 
in simple tasks.  Norman, (1981) posited three major 
types – errors in the formation of intentions, faulty 
activation of schemata, and false triggering of actions. 
The consequences of cognitive failures can be serious, 
including automobile and aircraft accidents (Larson, 
Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Reason, 1977, 
1979), unintentional shoplifting (Reason & Lucas, 
1984), and industrial accidents (Hassanzadeh-Rangi, 
Farshad, Khosravi, Zare, & Mirkazemi, 2014). 
Because enlisted personnel in the United States 
Air Force engage in a variety of occupations in which 
cognitive failures can be disastrous (e.g., aircraft 
maintenance, air traffic and combat control, munitions 
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maintenance, and airborne cryptologic language 
analysis, to mention just a few of the 200-plus Air 
Force occupations), the Air Force Research Laboratory 
was interested in understanding the structure and 
determinants of cognitive failures.
The incidence of cognitive failures has been related 
to various factors: boredom, worry, divided attention 
(Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997), 
working memory overload, diminished attention and 
vigilance levels, and incidental learning (Broadbent, 
Cooper, FitzGerald, & Parkes, 1982; Pollina, Greene, 
Tunick, & Puckett, 1992).  Personality correlates of 
cognitive failures include social consciousness and 
social anxiety (Houston, 1989).  A fairly comprehensive 
review of the cognitive failures literature including the 
effects of situational factors, transient psychological 
states, and neurological variables is available from 
Carrigan & Barkus (2016).
In recent years research has emerged on mind-
wandering, a construct conceptually related to cognitive 
failures. The cognitive mechanisms involved in the 
phenomenon of mind-wandering are the subject of 
some debate (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010; Smallwood, 
2010).  However, in a study closer to the concerns of 
the present research, Robison, Gath, and Unsworth 
(2017) investigated how individual differences in mind-
wandering were a function of working memory capacity, 
attentional control, and neuroticism.  In neuroticism the 
person experiences unwanted thoughts that intrude on 
task focus. The results of their correlational study showed 
that persons scoring high on neuroticism reported more 
mind-wandering during cognitive tasks, showed lower 
working memory capacity, and poorer attention control. 
In another study, Kane et al. (2007) found that in 
cognitive tasks placing high demands on concentration, 
high working memory capacity individuals were better 
at maintaining on-task thoughts and engaged in less 
mind-wandering than were lower working memory 
capacity individuals. These findings were consistent with 
theories of working memory that emphasize the role of 
executive attention and control processes in determining 
individual differences in cognitive performance.
Other research in this paradigm has suggested 
that mind-wandering is not necessarily negative.  For 
example, Baird, Smallwood, and Schooler (2011) 
found that when persons with greater working memory 
capacity let their minds wander, they often engage 
in thoughts about the future. This evidence suggests 
that using spare capacity to think productively (e.g. 
planning the next action) during relatively simple tasks 
reflects a cognitive system that is adaptively functioning 
(Smallwood & Andrews-Hanna, 2013). But this issue 
is far from settled. Robison and Unsworth (2017) 
conducted a study that failed to replicate the finding 
that working memory capacity is positively related to 
future-oriented off-task thought.
Another construct that is conceptually related to 
cognitive failures is mindfulness, which is defined as 
“the state of being attentive to and aware of what is 
taking place in the present … and can be considered 
an enhanced attention to and awareness of current 
experience or present reality” (Brown & Ryan, 2003, p. 
822).  Klockner and Hicks (2015) found a correlation of 
-.73 between a self-report measure of cognitive failures 
and the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). 
Also, of the five personality factors they included in 
their study only neuroticism (or anxiety) was correlated 
with cognitive failures (r = .52).
Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, and Schooler 
(2013) reported an experiment that examined whether 
a training course on mindfulness would decrease mind 
wandering and improve performance on working memory 
and academic achievement tests. Mindfulness training 
improved both GRE reading comprehension scores and 
working memory capacity.  Also noted were reductions in 
the occurrence of distracting thoughts while responding 
to the GRE and the working memory test. 
Mindfulness as defined by Brown and Ryan (2003) 
appears to be tapping a construct similar in some respects 
to the need for cognition, which has been defined as 
“a need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, 
integrated ways” and “a need to understand and make 
reasonable the experiential world” (Cohen, Stotland, & 
Wolfe, 1955, p. 291). More recently, Cacioppo and Petty 
(1982) defined the need for cognition as an individual’s 
tendency to “engage in and enjoy thinking” (p. 116) 
and the tendency to “organize, abstract, and evaluate 
information” (p. 124).  They also defined the construct 
as a stable propensity to engage in and intrinsically enjoy 
effortful cognitive work (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis, 1996; Thompson, Chaiken, & Hazelwood, 1993). 
With regards to the relationship between the 
need for cognition and the propensity for cognitive 
failures, if the need for cognition is positively related 
to mindfulness, then the correlation between the need 
for cognition and cognitive failures would be negative. 
If instead a high need for cognition is characteristic of 
pensive individuals who get lost in their thoughts (or let 
their minds wander) and make distracted errors, then 
the correlation would be positive.  No study relating the 
need for cognition to cognitive failures has been found 
in the published literature.
The Dimensionality of the Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire
The majority of the published research on cognitive 
failures has involved self-report questionnaires often 
using an instrument devised by Broadbent, Cooper, 
FitzGerald, & Parkes (1982). Broadbent et al. (1982) 
developed the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) 
to measure the propensity to have lapses in three 
areas: perception, memory, and motor function.  It 
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was expected that a general factor of cognitive failures 
would suffice. But factor analyses of the CFQ suggested 
a more complex model.  In the research literature there 
are reports of two and seven factor models (Matthews, 
Coyle, & Craig, 1990), five factors (Pollina et al., 1992), 
four factors (Wallace, Kass, & Stanny, 2002), and three 
factors (Larson et al., 1997).  These previous analyses 
were all in the exploratory mode with either principal 
factors or components.  
Most recently Bridger, Johnsen, and Brasher (2013) 
reported a confirmatory factor analysis of the CFQ in 
which a five-factor model was fit to the data resulting 
in a comparative fit index (CFI) of .87, and a root mean 
square of approximation (RMSEA) of .07, neither of 
which indicate a good model fit.  A single factor model 
was only marginally worse: CFI = .84, RMSEA = .07. 
But Bridger et al. (2013) found that Cronbach’s alpha 
was .92, which is evidence of high internal consistency 
for a unidimensional construct.  These investigators 
also reported a test-retest reliability of .71 over two 
years, which suggests a human characteristic that is 
fairly stable over time.
In the present study confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to test a nested hierarchical model, a type of 
structural model that has been used in the cognitive 
abilities domain (e.g., Chaiken, Kyllonen, & Tirre, 
2000; Gustafsson & Balke, 1993; Tirre & Field, 2002; 
Tirre & Raouf, 1998). In the nested hierarchical model 
a general factor is posited which underlies all items, 
and various group factors are posited for smaller sets of 
items.  The group factors are orthogonal to the general 
factor and to each other.  Thus, a nested hierarchical 
model attempts to reconcile a multiple correlated 
group factor model with a general factor model, by 
positing a general factor that loads all variables and 
various orthogonal group factors which load smaller 
sets of variables.  Rasch measurement analysis (Rasch, 
1960/1980; Wright & Stone, 1979) was also employed 
as an alternative method to investigate dimensionality.
Determinants of Cognitive Failures
It was suspected that even if cognitive failures primarily 
reflected a unitary dimension, it was possible that there 
were multiple paths leading to errors of this nature. The 
studies reviewed suggest various factors of individual 
differences that could be hypothesized as determinants 
of cognitive failures.  Included here are working 
memory/attention and general cognitive ability, need 
for cognition/mindfulness, and the personality factors 
of anxiety, conscientiousness, and intellect. Thus, there 
are four hypotheses that can be posited:
H1: Cognitive failures reflect individual differences 
in general cognitive ability such that persons 
who have less cognitive ability are more prone 
to cognitive failures. As tests of general cognitive 
ability place high demands on working memory 
(Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Carpenter, Just, & 
Shell, 1990), this hypothesis is related to the 
overloaded working memory hypothesis (e.g., 
Robison, Gath, & Unsworth, 2017). Two types of 
general cognitive ability measures were employed. 
The Speeded Cognitive Abilities Test is an example 
of a heterogeneous measure of intelligence (or 
general cognitive ability) (Gustafsson, 1994) 
which attempts to tap the common variance among 
a diverse set of cognitive items.  The Stanford-
Binet might be the first historical example of 
this type of intelligence measure.  The Abstract 
Reasoning test is an example of a homogeneous 
measure of intelligence (Gustafsson, 1994) which 
attempts to tap the core processes of cognitive 
ability like eduction of relations and correlates 
with a narrowly specified set of items.  The Ravens 
Progressive Matrices test is an early example of 
this type of intelligence measure.  Two types of 
general cognitive ability tests were included in the 
predictor set so that the construct could be more 
adequately measured.
H2: The second hypothesis is actually two opposing 
hypotheses.  H2a posits that cognitive failures are 
positively correlated with the need for cognition 
(or intellect/openness), because pensive, reflective 
individuals might be expected to be more prone to 
absentminded mistakes. In contrast, H2b posits that 
individuals with a high need for cognition (i.e., a 
need to engage in cognitively demanding tasks) are 
more mindful of situations as they unfold and can 
avoid careless mistakes. The Big Five personality 
factor intellect (openness) is conceptually related 
to need for cognition and was included in the 
predictor set because at least one study reported 
a negative correlation between intellect and 
incidence of cognitive failures (Di Fabio, 2006).
H3: The third hypothesis is that highly anxious 
persons are more prone to cognitive failures 
because worry and emotionality direct attention 
away from other cognitive processes (Broadbent, 
Broadbent, & Jones, 1986; Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2009; Klockner & Hicks, 2015; Robison et al., 
2017; Sarason, 1988; Wine, 1971).
H4: It is hypothesized that conscientiousness is 
negatively associated with self-reported cognitive 
failures. Conscientious people are typically self-
disciplined, emotionally stable, hardworking, 
and achievement-oriented. They adhere to 
social norms, engage in goal-directed behavior, 
take responsibility, keep organized, and avoid 
risk-taking. Highly conscientious people are 
hypothesized to expend extra effort to avoid 
cognitive failures, hence a negative correlation 
is predicted.  Klockner and Hicks (2015) did not 
find a correlation between workplace errors and 
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conscientiousness; but this relationship might vary 
across populations and work contexts.
These hypotheses were tested using multiple 
regression with scores on a general factor derived from 
the Broadbent Cognitive Failures Questionnaire as the 
dependent variable.
Method
Participants
The sample for the analysis of the Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire was composed of 992 USAF airmen in 
basic training.  Eighty-two percent of the sample was 
male, with a mean age of 19.8 years with a range of 17 
to 31. The demographic breakdown was 68% (in USAF 
population: 61%) white, 15% (23%) black, 9% (10%) 
Hispanic, 7% (6%) Asian and other racial groups. In 
terms of education, .5% did not have a high school 
diploma or General Education Diploma (GED), 1.6% 
had a GED, 57% had a high school diploma, 36% had 
some college, 3% had an associate’s degree, 1.6% had 
a bachelor’s degree, and .3% had some graduate work. 
For the entire battery of tests, 552 cases had complete 
data after listwise deletion.
Instruments
Three psychological questionnaires and two cognitive 
ability tests were administered:
1. Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent et 
al., 1982) -- a self-report measure of the relative 
frequency of various types of “minor mistakes” made 
in the past six months. A five point scale was used (0 
= Never, 1= Very rarely, 2 = Occasionally, 3 = Quite 
often, 4 = Very often). There were 25 items.
2. Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) -- This 
test consisted of 46 items about the respondent’s 
mental habits and preferences for deep thinking 
and problem solving.  Each statement was rated 
on a five-point Likert scale: Strongly Disagree, 
Disagree, Neutral, Agree, Strongly Agree.
3. Self-Descriptive Inventory (Christal, 1993; Collis 
& Barucky, 1999) -- a measure of the Big Five 
Personality factors (Digman, 1990), viz., Openness 
(or Intellect), Conscientiousness, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (or Anxiety). 
There were 164 items asking the respondents 
to indicate how often a descriptive phrase or 
word applies to them (Always, Usually, Often, 
Sometimes, Rarely, Never).
4. Speeded Cognitive Ability Test (SCAT) -- a 20 
minute speeded intelligence test modeled after the 
Wonderlic Personnel Test with a variety of item types 
involving verbal, spatial, and quantitative content.  
5. Abstract Reasoning Test (Embretson, 1998) -- a 
nonverbal figural reasoning test of 20 items based 
on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test.  Each item 
presented a 3x3 array of figures, with one position 
blank to be filled in by one of eight options that 
completed the pattern by some logical rule. 
Procedure
Paper-and-pencil tests were administered in two 
counterbalanced orders to groups of 40 respondents 
in classrooms.
Results
Dimensionality of the CFQ
One way to test the dimensionality of the CFQ is 
to submit the item response data to Rasch model 
analysis.  The key statistics from this analysis were the 
Person Separation Reliability = .909 and the Person 
Separation Index = 3.16 (which indicates that about 
five strata were distinguishable in the measure).  Only 
two items (7 & 10) did not fit the Rasch model well 
according to the Mean Square Infit (1.39, 1.38) and the 
Mean Square Outfit (1.39, 1.36) criteria.  Overall, the 
Rasch analysis indicated that one dimension appeared 
to underlie the measure.
A second way to test the dimensionality of the 
CFQ was confirmatory factor analysis via EQS (Bentler, 
2006) which indicated that a multifactorial, viz., a 
nested hierarchical model, provided an advantage in 
goodness of fit (see Table 1).  However, this analysis 
also indicated that the general factor was very strong, 
accounting for 70.5% of the common variance.  The 
five group factors loaded only three items apiece and 
accounted for a smaller percentage of the observed 
variance, 29.5%, with values ranging from 2.95 to 7.57 
percent for the individual factors.
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Table 1
Confirmatory factor analysis of broadbent cognitive failures questionnaire
Item
General
Cognitive
Failure
Forget
Names
Forget
Turns
Failure to
Comprehend
Reading
Lose
Temper
Confuse
Left & Right Communality
BCF01 0.429 0.903 0.999
BCF02 0.592 0.189 0.386
BCF03 0.588 0.189 0.381
BCF04 0.513 0.858 0.999
BCF05 0.536 0.159 0.313
BCF06 0.635 0.403
BCF07 0.450 0.460 0.414
BCF08 0.562 0.173 0.346
BCF09 0.543 0.119 0.309
BCF10 0.450 0.520 0.473
BCF11 0.490 0.192 0.277
BCF12 0.528 0.849 1.000
BCF13 0.665 -0.207 0.485
BCF14 0.550 0.303
BCF15 0.588 0.346
BCF16 0.597 0.356
BCF17 0.644 0.415
BCF18 0.630 0.157 0.422
BCF19 0.604 0.170 0.394
BCF20 0.518 0.634 0.670
BCF21 0.676 0.457
BCF22 0.645 0.416
BCF23 0.674 0.454
BCF24 0.555 0.308
BCF25 0.546 0.298
Sums of Squares: 8.194 0.628 0.782 0.880 0.343 0.797 11.624
% of Variance: 70.489 5.400 6.730 7.571 2.952 6.858
Goodness of Fit: df chi-square p chi-square/df CFI RMSEA
Single Factor: 275 1,336.47 <.001 4.86 0.876 0.062
Six Factor: 260 879.42 <.002 3.38 0.927 0.049
Note: df = degrees of freedom, CFI = comparative fit index, RMSEA= root mean square of approximation.
Chi-square difference = 457.05, degrees of freedom = 15, p < .0001.
The data for the CFQ were also analyzed with the 
SPSS Factor program which can provide factor scores. 
A principal axes factor analysis with a Quartimax 
rotation was run and factor scores were computed. The 
Quartimax rotation was chosen because it provides a 
solution in which the first factor is essentially a general 
factor, and it and the remaining narrower factors are 
orthogonal to each other.  As it turns out, the factor 
loadings for the first factor for the Quartimax solution 
were correlated r = .995 with those from the general 
factor resulting from the nested hierarchal solution 
obtained from EQS.  Thus, the general factor score for 
the CFQ (GCFQ) was selected as the dependent variable 
for subsequent analysis.
Descriptive statistics and correlates of the CFQ
The descriptive statistics for all variables are presented 
in Table 2.  
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Regression model of the CFQ
Zero order correlations among the variables (Table 
3) indicated that all variables other than the SCAT 
score were significantly related to cognitive failures. 
The strongest correlates of cognitive failures were 
anxiety (r = .45), need for cognition (r = -.41), and 
conscientiousness (r = -.37). 
A regression model in which the general factor for 
the CFQ (GCFQ) was regressed on the five personality 
variables, need for cognition, and the two cognitive 
ability variables explained 36.5 percent of the criterion 
variance (Table 4).  The strongest prediction in terms 
of standardized regression coefficients were by need for 
cognition (beta = -.332), anxiety (beta = .302), and 
conscientiousness (beta = -.263).  Other significant 
predictors were intellect (beta = .193), and abstract 
reasoning (beta = -.131).
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for all variables
Variable Mean SD Reliability*
Cognitive Failures 0.065 .976 .92
Abstract Reasoning 12.795 4.808 .87
SCAT 30.797 6.775 .87
Intellect 0.015 .997 .92
Conscientious -0.005 .989 .94
Extraversion 0.021 .977 .94
Agreeableness -0.011 .989 .95
Anxiety -0.041 .976 .95
Need for Cognition 0.017 .996 .93
Note. N = 552.  All variables except abstract reasoning and speeded 
cognitive ability test are factor scores.
*All reliability estimates were Cronbach’s alpha, except for the 
speeded cognitive ability test which was a split-half reliability.
Table 3
Correlations among all variables
CF NFC INT SCAT AR AG ANX EXT CONS
Cognitive Failures (CF) 1.000
Need for Cognition (NFC) -0.413 1.000
Intellect (INT) -0.084 0.606 1.000
SCAT -0.050 0.188 0.120 1.000
Abstract Reasoning (AR) -0.129 0.183 0.134 0.458 1.000
Agreeableness (AG) -0.182 0.250 0.193 -0.064 -0.023 1.000
Anxiety (ANX) 0.452 -0.344 -0.028 -0.149 -0.068 -0.155 1.000
Extraversion (EXT) -0.130 0.238 0.139 -0.001 -0.012 0.147 -0.164 1.000
Conscientious (CONS) -0.374 0.343 0.237 -0.076 -0.090 0.361 -0.180 0.204 1.000
Note. N = 552. Critical r for p < .05 is .0834.
Table 4
Regression equation for predicting cognitive failures
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients Correlations
B Std. Error Beta      t p Zero-order Partial
(Constant) .090 .163 .552 .581
Need for Cognition -.325 .048 -.332 -6.725 .000 -.413 -.277
Intellect .189 .044 .193 4.339 .000 -.084 .183
SCAT .011 .006 .074 1.876 .061 -.050 .080
Abstract Reasoning -.027 .008 -.131 -3.351 .001 -.129 -.142
Agreeableness .003 .037 .003 .081 .935 -.182 .003
Anxiety .302 .038 .302 7.917 .000 .452 .322
Extraversion .023 .036 .023 .644 .520 -.130 .028
Conscientious -.260 .039 -.263 -6.748 .000 -.374 -.278
Note. R-square = .365, F(8, 543) = 39.05, p < .0001
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Note that need for cognition and intellect, which 
are correlated at about r = .6, and are both negatively 
correlated with cognitive failures, had regression 
coefficients opposite in sign.  The negative relationship 
(either zero order correlation or regression coefficient) 
found for need for cognition was the opposite of what 
was predicted. This finding and the positive regression 
weight for intellect indicated the need for an analysis 
of how these variables combine in relation to cognitive 
failures.  A similar situation was noted for abstract 
reasoning and the speeded cognitive ability test, which 
were positively correlated (r = .46) to each other, 
and negatively related to cognitive failures, but had 
regression coefficients opposite in sign (beta = -.132 
and .074 ns, respectively).
In situations like this with strongly correlated 
predictors, one approach is to create composite variables. 
In this case, an intellect/need for cognition composite 
was created; and a g (general cognitive ability) composite 
was created from abstract reasoning and the speeded 
cognitive ability test.  The multiple regression with these 
composites replacing their component variables explained 
30.8 percent of the variance (down from 36.5 percent); 
and the regression coefficients were reduced in absolute 
value (beta: -.100 for composite vs. -.332 for need for 
cognition and .193 for intellect; -.074 for composite vs. 
-.131 for abstract reasoning and .074 for SCAT).
A second approach is to simply eliminate the 
variable in each pair that manifests less correlation 
with the dependent variable.  In this case, that meant 
eliminating intellect and the SCAT Personnel Test.  The 
resulting percentage of variance explained fell to 33.9 
from 36.5 and the regression coefficients were reduced 
(beta: -.198 vs. -.332 for need for cognition, -.091 vs. 
-.131 for abstract reasoning).
The pattern of relationships among the dependent 
variable, the need for cognition, and intellect, and 
among the dependent variable, abstract reasoning, and 
the speeded cognitive ability test exemplify suppression 
effects (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  A suppressor 
variable is substantially correlated with another predictor 
but is weakly correlated with the dependent variable. 
The variance the suppressor shares with the other 
predictor is irrelevant to the dependent variable.  Thus, 
when a suppressor variable is included in the regression 
equation, unwanted variance in the predictor is removed 
or “suppressed” and the regression weight for the 
predictor increases. It appears that intellect and the Speed 
Cognitive Ability Test were suppressor variables and their 
coefficients will not be given a substantive interpretation.
Discussion
The evidence obtained from this study and its 
predecessors in the literature suggest that cognitive 
failures as measured by Broadbent’s questionnaire are 
multidimensional with a dominating general factor. 
There is also evidence, albeit limited to one study, that 
there is some stability to the measure over time.  This 
fact suggests that one can think of cognitive failures as 
a characteristic propensity of the individual to make 
absent-minded errors, have lapses of attention, to forget 
what task one is supposed to be doing etc.  The exact 
degree to which it is generalizable across situations 
is at this point still unknown.  This research question 
might be approached through a faceted test design 
and application of generalizability theory (G-theory, 
Shavelson & Webb, 1991).  G-theory estimates variance 
in scores based on each person, each facet, and their 
combination (interactions). If facets (e.g., situations and 
types of cognitive failures) are small sources of error 
variance, then one can be more confident that cognitive 
failures are generalizable and characteristic of people.
One limitation of this study is that both the 
dependent variable (cognitive failures) and most of 
the predictor variables were measured through self-
reporting. The validity of self-report measures can be 
compromised by social desirability, though there are 
measures of this type of response bias (Paulhus, 1991) 
for statistical mitigation of this threat to validity. It 
would be preferable to have a performance test in which 
the construct of cognitive failures could be measured 
objectively.  An example might be a driving simulation 
with multiple intermittent situations requiring operator 
attentiveness to avoid an accident (Gugerty & Tirre, 
2000).  The drawback with performance tests is that 
they tend to be domain specific (which works against 
generalizability) and because cognitive failures are 
intermittent, a good measure would require several 
hours of testing.  A self-report rating scale such as 
Broadbent’s Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) 
remains a viable and practical choice for the study of 
cognitive failure as a predictor variable.
In the present study, the CFQ was used as a 
dependent variable because the goal was to understand 
its dimensionality and its correlates in the personality 
and cognitive domains.  Evidence from both Rasch 
model analysis and confirmatory factor analysis 
indicated that a general factor explained about 71 
percent of the variance.  Five narrow factors loading 
three items each were also identified, which together 
accounted for about 29 percent of the variance.
Most of the hypothesized relationships were 
confirmed by the analysis.  People who report making 
relatively frequent but usually minor cognitive mistakes 
tend to be higher in anxiety and lower in conscientiousness, 
suggesting that their attention might be divided between 
their immediate cognitive tasks and their internal 
psychological states, perhaps including worries and 
ruminations.  Frequent cognitive failures might also 
appear in people who are less disciplined and orderly in 
their behaviors (signaling low conscientiousness).  
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Interestingly, a high need for cognition was 
negatively associated with cognitive failures, which 
was consistent with hypothesis H2b, not positively as in 
hypothesis H2a.  Thus, the person who enjoys complex 
ideas and abstractions is not someone who is so lost in 
his thoughts that he makes absent-minded mistakes. 
Instead, persons with a high need for cognition tend 
to operate well in the “here and now” and avoid this 
type of mistake.  There is also a modest positive 
correlation between need for cognition and the general 
cognitive ability measures used in this study, which is 
to be expected.  Recall that abstract reasoning was also 
negatively associated with cognitive failures; but ability 
as measured by the speeded cognitive ability test was 
not significantly related.
Another limitation of this study was that 
participants were young people about 20 years of age 
on average. Age might interact with cognitive ability or 
personality factors in influencing cognitive failures and 
this study cannot address such hypotheses.  
There is much to be learned about how seemingly 
minor cognitive mistakes can occur.  The evidence 
acquired in this study indicates that certain stable 
attributes of the person in the personality and ability 
domains might indicate a propensity for these mistakes. 
But much of the systematic variance in cognitive 
failures remains unexplained, and it could be that task 
and situational demands and their interaction with 
individual attributes will explain much of the residual 
variance.  Future research on cognitive failures might 
benefit from a carefully constructed instrument that goes 
beyond the original definition offered by Broadbent et al. 
(1982) which focused on memory problems and action 
slips. The definition might be expanded to incorporate 
other types of common everyday failures such as errors 
occurring during problem solving, distractibility, and 
mind-wandering (Carrigan & Barkus, 2016). A faceted 
design for a questionnaire might use multiple varieties 
of cognitive failures as one facet and perhaps situation or 
context as another, making it possible to better test the 
dimensionality and the generalizability of the construct.
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